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The distinguished political scientist and former President
of Oberlin College, Robert Carr, and his associate Daniel Van
Eyck, have made a critical examination of collective bargaining
by four-year college and university faculties. They write largely
from the perspective of the nation's elite institutions which have
enjoyed a tradition of faculty influence in institutional affairs.
Thus it is not surprising that they are troubled by what they encounter. Like the Arcadians who while wandering in a grove
happen upon the tomb in Poussin's second Et in Arcadia Ego, the
work conjures up "the retrospective vision of an unsurpassable
happiness, enjoyed in the past, unattainable ever after, yet enduringly alive in the memory .

. . ."I

It is perhaps characteristic

of the elegiac tradition that while contemporary affairs are
viewed with a healthy skepticism, the remembrance of what
appear to be better days obscures the evaluation of novel, if
makeshift, remedies for the ills accurately perceived.
Accordingly, this discussion will suggest, without denying
some of the evils suggested by Carr and Van Eyck, that collective bargaining may provide the means by which a troubled profession can ameliorate at least some of its current malaise. To
do this, attention should be devoted first to the circumstances
conducing toward the increasing acceptance of collective bargaining.
I.

CAUSES OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The authors propose three conditions for a faculty's engagement in collective bargaining: faculty dissatisfaction, an
applicable collective bargaining law, and organizational efforts
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by "outside" organizations. 2 To be sure, collective bargaining
here as elsewhere has been encouraged by a statute which allows
employees to select a collective representative and which requires the employer to bargain with the agent so selected. 3 But
the authors' heavy reliance on "outside" organizational activity
does not square with my experience, nor does it seem consistent
with their own assumption of faculty dissatisfaction as a necessary precondition to faculty collective bargaining. It is well to
note that collective bargaining came to institutions as diverse as
the University of Rhode Island, the University of Bridgeport
(Conn.), Boston State College, and the State University of New
York (SUNY) on the affirmative recommendation of their
respective faculty governments. Indeed at Boston State the
faculty senate ran as a candidate, and in SUNY the senate withdrew its candidacy in favor of a senate-sponsored membership
organization. At Bard College (N.Y.) the faculty urged the
board of trustees to recognize a bargaining agent by resolution
of the faculty meeting. Even the Berkeley division of the academic senate of the University of California has engendered an
affiliate now preparing to offer itself as a bargaining agent for
that faculty, once appropriate legislation is enacted.
One can discern at least four highly interrelated factors,
wholly apart from the availability of legislation and the attendant efforts of would-be collective bargaining agents, which
have produced a sufficient sense of anxiety to render collective
bargaining acceptable to otherwise nonunion oriented faculty
majorities. They are the declining economic status of the profession, the shift in the labor market, an increased concern for
job security, and an erosion in institutional, and hence faculty,
autonomy.
Economic Decline: As the authors observe, 4 AAUP figures
for 1970-71, aptly titled At the Brink5, revealed a profession
which was at a virtual economic standstill-professorial compensation (salary and fringe benefits) had increased 6.2 percent
over the previous year, while the consumer price index had
2 The class of "outside" organizations would include all membership organizations outside of the official internal faculty governing structure, including
particularly affiliates of the three national organizations competing to represent
the professoriate-the American Federation of Teachers (AFT, AFL-CIO), the
National Education Association (NEA), and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).
3 See, e.g., Graham, Effects of NLRB Jurisdictional Change on Union Organizing Activity in the Proprietary Health Care Sector, in 1971 IRRA PROCEEDINGS 273
(1972).
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risen just under 6.0 percent. Thus the purchasing power of
the average faculty salary had decreased 0.6 percent. The story
is now more complete. Figures for 1971-72, this time entitled
Coping with Adversity, 6 reported an increase in CPI of 4.3 percent
and increases in average faculty compensation and salary of
4.3 percent and 3.6 percent respectively-yielding an additional
decrease in purchasing power of 0.7 percent. Although a slight
increase in purchasing power was recorded for 1972-73, it was
predicated on a 3.3 percent increase in the CPI. The report
for that period, Surviving the Seventies, makes clear, "The real
(constant dollar) value of the average faculty salary remains
below what it was three years ago, and the prospect of greater
reduction in the years ahead is unmistakable. '7 That prospect
was realized in academic year 1973-74 where, due to inflation,
the average professor lost about 1.5 percent in purchasing
power despite general salary increases. As the report, Hard
Times, pointed out, the average professor fared slightly worse
than the average worker.8
Buyer's Labor Market: The "tightness" of the academic
job market, while varying according to discipline, has become
an accepted fact of contemporary academic life. Alan Cartter's
estimates, not the most alarming of those available, project a
serious and increasing labor market imbalance. 9 Zero growth in
teaching faculty in the 1980's will, he suggests, be accompanied
by a substantial oversupply of Ph.D.'s. Even those taking a critical view of some of the projections in this area have concluded
that a likely consequence of Ph.D. production will be a considerably lowered income for Ph.D.'s relative to other workers.' °
Threats to Job Security: According to Cartter, the foregoing
changes in the labor market will result in "loosened" tenure
provisions later on "so that bright younger faculty can more
easily displace senior faculty whose teaching or scholarly performance is relatively ineffective."" Indeed, attacks on the
tenure system have become sufficiently acute to warrant the
creation of an independent national Commission on Academic
Tenure in Higher Education, funded by the Ford Foundation.
The Commission's report, while reaffirming the basic tenets of
the tenure system, seems also to have endorsed the notion of
58 AAUP BULL. 178 (1972).
59 AAUP BULL. 188, 189 (1973).
8 60 AAUP BULL 171 (1974).
6
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tenure "quotas" which may contribute
further to faculty anxiety
2
particularly in the junior ranks.1
Erosion of Autonomy: Although in their introductory chapter
the authors mention the erosion of institutional autonomy, 13
they nowhere develop that threat as itself contributing to the
acceptability of collective bargaining by university faculty. On
the contrary, they suggest that legislative interference in the
institution's internal affairs may be encouraged by resort to
collective bargaining, seemingly as an argument against that
engagement. I suggest a more comprehensive scrutiny of the
situation which, the authors' survey data reveal, has made collective bargaining increasingly acceptable to academics.
The present situation may be illuminated by comparing it
to a previous era of economic distress. Of the 931 four-year institutions existing in 1931, more than half enrolled less than 500
students and only about nine percent enrolled more than
2500.14 Public institutions accounted for only twenty-eight percent of the total.' 5 Four decades later, less than twenty-five
percent of 2,606 universities, colleges and junior colleges enrolled fewer than 500 students, and almost a third enrolled
more than 2,500.16 Some thirty institutions alone enrolled more
than 30,000 students each. Moreover, about half the institutions
in the country are now publicly operated. 1 7 Income from
federal sources rose from twenty-one million dollars in 1930 to
about 3.5 billion in 1970.18 Income from state and local government rose from 152 million to better than 6.5 billion in the
same period. 19 In 1968 the public and private sectors accounted
for 452,872 and 262,077 faculty and professional staff respectively, that is, sixty-three percent of all such employees were
engaged in the public sector.2 ° In sum, to a considerable extent
the profession now finds itself employed by a large, impersonal
bureaucracy, administrated by cadres of professional administrators over whose decisions it has no control and little influence. Even those components of the educational structure which
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have been able to resist the tendency find themselves increasingly "coordinated" by statewide masterplanning agencies or
"superboards."' It is hardly surprising that professors, like
other highly trained professionals employed by public institutions to provide service to clients, would want to assert some
influence over the policies governing their professional lives.
In response to these conditions, it is instructive to note the
alternative posed, perhaps rhetorically, by Carr and Van Eyck:
Cannot a university president, as spokesman for an
academic community that has worked out a statement
of its needs and expectations internally through a wellconceived structure of institutional gQvernance, make
a more persuasive and productive presentation of his
institution's case at the state capital or in Washington
than do or will the dual agents of management and
labor defending the requirements
of a contract reached
22
through collective bargaining?
A short answer is supplied by the President of one organized
university-"The faculty, I am confident, did much better than
I could have done on its behalf. '23 A more detailed reply would
point out that collective bargaining whatever its drawbacks,
provides the hope, at least, of a partial remedy for the profession's ills. It mandates participation by the faculty in at least
some decisions before they are made, and the resulting agreement is enforceable. The former palliates the anxieties caused
by the increasing remoteness of decisionmaking, while the latter
assuages the profession's sensed insecurity.
A fuller analysis, however, may require a separate view of
the public and private sectors. The passage of a state public
employment bargaining law may be taken, as I suggest it clearly
was in Rhode Island, Hawaii and, to an extent, New York, as
a signal to faculty members in public institutions of the way the
state intends to deal with them. The authors, however, cite the
overwhelming "no agent" vote at Michigan State University to
indicate that it is too early to base firm predictions of the trend
in faculty collective bargaining. 24 On the other hand, they ob2" For more on the erosion of autonomy see L. GLENNY
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serve that public institution bargaining in Michigan has been a
rather piecemeal affair with each institution having independent access to the legislature for its appropriation. Assuming a
more coherent bargaining structure, should the gains made by
other segments of organized state workers exceed those of the
unorganized (elite) public institutions and, indeed, should the
legislature view those funds as "soft" relative to the "hard"
dollars bargained for by public employee unions, I little doubt
the reversal of the Michigan State vote.
In sum, I disagree that the record in the public sector is too
slender "to support generalizations in which confidence can
be placed. '25 Indeed, the growth of faculty collective bargaining has been most dramatic in the public sector. 26 Unless the
legislative and executive branches assure equitable treatment of
unorganized public university faculties, those branches must
understand that collective bargaining is not an option, but
rather a necessity. I do not anticipate that most state governments will be so equitable or restrained, or that the faculties of
major state institutions will be so imbued with a spirit of selfsacrifice as to eschew collective representation when the result
of that eschewal will seem to them to mean their subsidization
not of the university but, say, of the state police.
Moreover, the authors' rhetorical question perforce assumes that existing internal provisions for faculty participation
in budgetary and other decisions are satisfactory to the faculty;
this suggests in turn the key to the growth of collective bargaining in the private sector. Here we may discern three broad categories of institution, in two of which collective bargaining
should not generally be expected to secure majority support.
They are strange bedfellows, for on the one hand is the elite
university whose faculty may have faith that it is being treated
as well as it can reasonably expect under the circumstances, and
on the other is the autocratic institution whose faculty is simply
too timorous to support a union. It is in the vast middle ground
made up of institutions whose faculties have both the will to
speak up and the desire to check administrative discretion, that
collective bargaining may be expected to take hold. For example, the faculty of Rider College (N.J.) chose a bargaining agent
only after the administration refused to accept the affirmative
recommendation of five faculty committees and the faculty as a
25

d. 62-65.
of June, 1974, 96 public four-year campuses had selected bargaining
agents and only four had voted for no agent in representation elections. On the
other hand, 37 private four-year institutions had selected agents while 22 had
rejected collective bargaining. The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 10,
1974, at 24.
26As
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whole on a tenure decision. 27 The Ashland College (Ohio)
faculty chose a bargaining agent only after the administration
terminated over forty members of the faculty for an alleged
"financial exigency. ' 28 The Bloomfield College (N.J.) faculty
chose an agent only after the board of trustees abolished the
college's tenure system, placed the entire faculty on one year's
notice of termination, and actually terminated more than a
faculty many of whom had been previously awarded
dozen 29
tenure.
Unlike the public sector, there may be an alternative to
collective bargaining in private colleges where the faculty participates in effect as fully in institutional decisions as it would in
collective bargaining. The authors fail, however, to give credit
to the availability of the selection of an agent under the federal
Act as a prod to more responsive administration. On the contrary, the authors resurrect the argument that faculties should
be held to be of a "managerial" or "supervisory" character and
deprived thereby of any right to bargain-an argument which
was pressed before the NLRB with some vigor, but no success,
by several institutional administrations.3 0 I have argued elsewhere for the soundness of the NLRB's decisions.3 1 Suffice it
to say here that in order to avoid the possible detrimental consequences of bargaining, Carr and Van Eyck would deprive faculties of both the possible advantages such bargaining could
bring, and, in the private sector particularly, of stronger faculty
participation should collective bargaining be rejected. Thus
the evils of bargaining perceived by Carr and Van Eyck must
be compelling indeed to demand so Draconian a result.
II.

THE EVILS PERCEIVED

First, Carr and Van Eyck lament the loss of institutional
autonomy by the intrusion of labor boards called on to decide
bargaining units, supervise elections and determine unfair practice charges. Relatedly, they regret that autonomy will be
further eroded as outsiders are brought in to resolve bargaining
impasses and to arbitrate grievances. Second, they expect the
27See Academic Freedom and Tenure: Rider College (New Jersey),

59 AAUP

BULL. 93 (1973).

28 The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 20, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
9See Academic Freedom and Tenure: Bloomfield College (New Jersey), 60 AAUP
BULL. 50 (1974). The tenured faculty were later ordered reinstated after a judicial
finding of the absence of a sufficient financial exigency to warrant their termination. AAUP, Bloomfield College Chapter v. Bloomfield College, No. C-4241-72
(N.J. Super. Ct., June 26, 1974).
30 CARR, supra note 4, at 36-37.
" Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 608 (1974).
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adversary attitudes imported by the process of collective bargaining and the exclusive representative status accorded the
bargaining agent by law to strain collegial relations between
faculty and administration independent of collective bargaining. Thus, they anticipate an erosion of the faculty's role in educational decisionmaking. Third, they expect, in view of the
majoritarian character of collective representation, that equalitarianism will supplant meritocracy particularly, for example,
in salary matters. Fourth, they fear the contract focus of collective representation will foster an attitude of "going by the book"
which may dampen flexibility for educational innovation.
Finally, the authors fear that academic freedom may be threatened.
Of interest here is the role of law in militating toward or
mitigating these consequences. Before proceeding to that question, however, some additional comment is required. First, the
assertion that the probable loss of autonomy militates per se
against collective bargaining compels us to determine when external intervention into institutional affairs is justified. It illserves us to invoke "institutional autonomy" for its incantatory
value in the face of every threatened intervention.3 2 It cannot
be contended seriously, for example, that the first amendment
should not apply to faculty members because judicial review of
decisions challenged under it is inherently erosive of autonomy.
Thus not every such intrusion, through erosive by definition, is
necessarily infelicitous. The real issue is whether the applicable
labor legislation, as interpreted by the appropriate administrative agencies and courts, is in fact responsive to the faculty's
needs or injurious to its sound functioning. For example, the
NLRB has attempted rather successfully to accommodate the
academic milieu fully in keeping with its charge under the Act.
Thus, as matters currently stand in the private sector, I do not
believe that, solely because the machinery of the Board is now
available, one is justified in concluding that the benefits of extending the Act are outweighed by the threat of "external intervention." 3 3
32 Carr and Van Eyck are by no means alone in the failure to make such a
distinction. See J. PERKINS, THE UNIVERSITY AND DUE PROCESS (1967) (address reprinted by the American Council on Education); Cleveland, The Muscle-Bound
Academy, 7 THE COLLEGE COUNSEL 1 (1972); Wilson, Campus Freedom and Order,
45 DENVER L.J. 502 (1968). But see Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View, 54 AAUP BULL. 143 (1968).

33 The authors express alarm on the basis of two unfair practice cases decided by the NLRB, in neither of which were the faculty member's allegations
sustained:
• . . institutional and faculty autonomy are subjected to a new and powerful external intrusion when decisions on faculty reappointments and ten-
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Turning to the role of outsiders in contract disputes, it is
clear that faculty are resorting increasingly, indeed exponentially, to the courts in disputes concerning nonrenewal or terminations of appointment 3 4 -the matters of highest concern to
Carr and Van Eyck. The choice for many institutions is not
autonomy vel non, but rather of the forum in which these grievances may be resolved. From this perspective, the use of arbitration has a decided advantage; the parties jointly select the
arbitrator and establish standards to guide his decision. In fact,
to the extent the parties fashion the collective agreement to protect the integrity of internal institutional affairs, the arbitrator
may actually serve
to stave off unwanted intrusion by other ex35
ternal agencies.
Second, dealing with collegial relations, Carr and Van Eyck
pose two rhetorical alternatives. On the one hand they posit a
faculty cooperating with the administration in decisionmaking,
that is, collegial "shared authority," and perforce sharing the
risks of "bold and enterprising policy decisions,' 36 and on the
other a faculty which stresses "the adversary relationship between themselves as employees and the organization's managers, not only using whatever bargaining power they can
muster to compel the managers to increase their salaries but also
conceding to management the entrepreneurial
functions of
' 37
assuming risks and deciding basic policies.
While the reconciliation of the role of exclusive bargaining representative with that of the faculty qua faculty in educational decisions is a complex and difficult problem, the assumption on which the alternatives are put obscures the issues. The
abnegation by the faculty of participation in educational decisionmaking will not result in decisions riskless to it. This is
particularly applicable in the private sector, where institutions
must find new constituencies, develop strong specializations, or
simply produce a higher quality product if they are to survive
competition with the cheaper mass education offered by public
ure . . . can finally be controlled partly by the way a government official
views the demeanor, as witnesses before him, of an institution's adminis-

trators and faculty members who have participated in actions under review.
CARR, supra note 4, at 286. While their concern may extend more profoundly
to our system of adjudication it seems to me that the labor boards have been
performing quite competently in this area. See Fashion Institute of Technology,

4 N.Y. PERB 4525 (1971); Donald Leon, 1 N.Y. PERB 800 (1968) (per Sovern,
hearing officer). See also Mid-Plains Educ. Ass'n v. Mid-Plains Nebraska Technical College, 80 LRRM 3407 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1972) (affirming the decision of
the Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations).

'4 See Finkin, Toward a Law of Academic Status, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 575 (1973).
'5 See Arbitration of Faculty Grievances, 59 AAUP BULL. 168 (1973).
36 CARR, supra note 4, at 292.
37 Id. 292-93 (emphasis in original).
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institutions. An ostensibly "bold and enterprising" decision here
may close an institution far more readily than an inflated salary
demand. As have other commentators who argue that collective
bargaining will reduce the faculty's role in educational decisions,
Carr and Van Eyck tend to ignore the fact that a prime stimulus
for resort to bargaining is the sensed inadequacy of current
faculty participation in those decisions. 38 Bargaining has become attractive because faculty want more participation rather
than less.
Having questioned their blanket character, it nevertheless
cannot be gainsaid that there is considerable validity in many
of the authors' fears. The question is whether the consequences
envisaged by Carr and Van Eyck are in fact inexorable in those
institutions which are both likely to engage in bargaining and
where these consequences would represent a retreat from
existing conditions of administration-faculty relations-that is,
relatively elite public institutions compelled to engage in bargaining by the dynamics of public employment representation,
and troubled but relatively mature private institutions. I have
suggested elsewhere that these consequences need not follow,
and that their realization depends on the interplay of several
variables: the nature and traditions of the institution, the character and policies of the bargaining agent, the employer's attitude toward bargaining and contract administration, the
composition of the bargaining unit, and the scope of bargaining. 9 The first three factors are essentially sociological or
political, rather than legal, save in the case of the third, where
relevant state legislation may restrict flexibility. While a number
of legal issues remain to be resolved, the experience thus far
indicates that the most influential role played by law and legal
institutions in shaping the consequences of bargaining lies in
the determination of the bargaining unit and of the scope of
bargaining.
III. THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
The authors devote considerable attention to the issues of
unit determination
in a chapter subheaded, "What Happens to
'the Faculty'? '40 The question is posed in two contexts. One discusses the implications of the unit decision to the interest of the
"core" faculty, the full-time members of the teaching and re-

"Compare Wollett, Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education-An Organization Perspective, 3 J. LAW & EDUC. 425 (1974), with Finkin, Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education-An Independent Perspective, 3. J. LAW & EDUC. 439 (1974).
Finkin, Collective Bargainingand University Government, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 125 (1971).
40 CARR, supra note 4, at 66.
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search staff. The other treats the role of the faculty, independent of petitioning or intervening labor organizations, in the
process of unit determination itself.
In the private sector the NLRB has, albeit haltingly, attempted to configure units composed essentially of full-time
teaching and research faculty and those few supportive professionals most closely associated with the educational mission. In
the public sector, however, the decisions dealing with geographic scope and occupational inclusion, display a wide divergence
in approach. For example, although the Massachusetts state
college system and all three public institutions in Rhode Island
are under single governing boards respectively, 4 1 some separate
campus units have been deemed appropriate, as they were in
42
Michigan where each institution is governed by its own board.
The Pennsylvania state colleges and the City University of New
York (CUNY) comprise a single unit respectively, and the
New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC)
has recently reversed its original unit determination, for that
state's state colleges, to hold a single unit appropriate although
each campus has its own board of trustees. In the State University of New York (SUNY) separate units were sought and
denied. 43 The resulting single unit included four university
centers, two separate medical centers, ten four-year colleges,
six two-year agricultural and technical schools and a maritime
college.
Unlike the private sector, public higher education tends to
be operated in large multicampus university and college systems. Thus the status of entire institutions presents in rather
bold terms the problem of shaping a bargaining structure that
is manageable from the state's perspective while remaining
responsive to the faculty. Moreover, it has become almost conventional wisdom that larger units are required in the public
sector.4 4 First, it is argued that the diffusion of managerial
authority in public employment requires that the unit be shaped
most proximate to that level of government having the power
to agree or make effective recommendations on negotiable
matters; the scope of bargaining itself plays a role in unit determination. Second, larger units avoid whipsawing and thereby
41
42

Id. 78.
Id.

43 Id.

75-78.

44 H. WELLINGTON & R..WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 97-114 (1971);

Mack, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Diffusion of Managerial Structure and Fragmentation of Bargaining Units, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 281 (1974); Rock, The Appropriate
Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L. Rav 1001
(1969).
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conduce toward more rational and stable labor relations.
Finally, in practical terms larger units reduce the burdens of
negotiation and impasse resolution. Thus commentators concerned particularly with multicampus systems have concluded
that only system-wide units are appropriate. 4 5 I disagree.
Simply because an agent is certified for a single campus
does not require that its authority extends no further than the
local campus administrator. In fact, there is a degree of inconsistency in the arguments just noted. If the scope of the agent's
authority were constricted according to unit determination,
smaller units would not produce whipsawing and irrationality
unless each unit were dealing separately with centralized
authority, which assumes that the agent's authority to bargain
goes beyond the local administrative unit. Thus the arguments
against "fragmentation" or unit "proliferation" depend essentially on these practical considerations. On that question, however, Clyde Summers has recently pointed out that the manageability of bargaining may in fact be better served by centralized
coordinated bargaining with a number of bargaining units,
than by dealing with a single unit. 46 Given the diversity of
groups included in large single units, Summers concludes that
the cost to the public employer in dealing with multiple units
may in fact be less than that of "negotiating with a conglomerate
union which is trying to represent
greater diversity than its
47
internal processes can reconcile.
Finally, inasmuch as we are concerned with institutions of
higher learning, arguments going to the employer's ease of bargaining obscure consideration of the relevant, if not critical,
question of the educational implications of unit structure. Accordingly, two additional considerations come into play. First,
there is a public interest in maintaining educational diversity
within a system. Bargaining, even if restricted to hardcore
economic and related matters, will of necessity affect educational policies. Hence the lumping together of diverse institutions, such as universities and former teacher colleges, in a
single unit will be destructive of that diversity and, over time,
become educationally harmful. Some state agencies have been
particularly sensitive to this consideration. The Oregon Public
Employee Relations Board (PERB), for example, established a
15Gee, Organizing the Halls of Ivy: Developing a Framework for Viable Alternatives
in Higher Education Employment, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 233, 266-67; McHugh, Collective Bargaining with Professionals in Higher Education: Problems in Unit Determinations, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 55, 82.
46

Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J.

115647(1974).
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separate unit for Southern Oregon College, one of nine institutions under the control of the state board of higher education. 48 In so doing it explicitly relied on the different "educational missions" of these institutions.
The educational interest in diversity alone may not be
dispositive, where, for example, all the institutions share a common mission or where, as in the case of the Pennsylvania State
University, the entire system's educational administration is
highly integrated. 4 9 However, even where institutions share in
general a common mission there may be an interest in retaining
a degree of autonomy and uniqueness for each campus, if homogenization is to be avoided. For both reasons the Minnesota
and Kansas Public Employment Boards recently and rightly or50
dered separate campus units for their respective state systems.
The foregoing may illustrate the need for greater sensitivity
and perception on the part of relevant labor boards in distinguishing the bargaining unit from the election district. Although they ostensibly determine the appropriate "bargaining
unit," the actual bargaining structure may be quite different
from the unit ordered by the board. The decision of the New
Jersey PERC finding a single unit of all the state colleges to be
appropriate 5' is instructive. In the period subsequent to the first
decision (ordering six separate units), affiliates of the NEA were
selected on each campus and negotiated a single system-wide
agreement. Prior to decertification, however, two new state
colleges were created. At the time of the second unit decision
both were small, neither shared the history of teacher-training
common throughout the system and at least one viewed itself
as somewhat experimental. 5 2 The special needs of these institu41Southern Oregon College, No. C-112 (Ore. PERB 1973).
49Pennsylvania State University No. PERA-R-801-C (Pa.

PERB 1973). The
difficulty here was that the branch campuses lacked any community of interest
with one another but had extensive interrelationships with the main campus;
for example the sub-branch faculty members had to be passed on by the appropriate academic department at the main campus. The decision acknowledges that
either a single unit or separate units would be mandated-rejecting the argument
for a single unit of the branch campuses. While it opts for a single unit based
on the effect of "over-fragmentation" the decision can be justified by the high
degree of integration with the main campus especially the apparent day-to-day
control the latter retained in the internal affairs of the branches.
50 Kansas State College (Pittsburgh, Kansas), No. UE2-1974 (Kan. PERB 1974).
Minnesota State College Board, Nos. 72-PR-180-A, 73-PR-414-A, 73-PR-431-A (Minn.
PERB 1974).
5' No. 72 (N.J. PERC 1972).
52 N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1971, at 49, col. 6.
Conspicuous by its absence from this list [of degrees offered] is a program in teacher preparation.
"I tell people who want that to go to one of the other state colleges,"
said Woodworth G. Thrombley, vice president for academic affairs. "They
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tions and their educational constituency may be ill-served by
the bargaining goals of the majority, which share a background
of teacher-training.
While six or eight election districts may not prove so burdensome in practical terms as to outweigh these educational
considerations, it is in the unusually large and highly diverse
systems such as SUNY that the problems of proliferation become acute. Here greater ingenuity and perhaps a willingness
to experiment may be called for. A clustering of campuses according to educational mission could have produced a four-unit
(medical schools, universities, state colleges, agricultural and
technical colleges) or two-unit (medical schools and universities,
state colleges and agricultural and technical colleges) structure
which, while remaining entirely manageable from the employer's perspective, would have been more serviceable to educational interests.
On the other hand, the proponents of larger units point
out that local autonomy can be provided for or accommodated
in a single state-wide collective agreement. 53 This ignores the
political implications of the election district decision. Under a
separate campus or clustered campus election unit structure,
the agents selected owe a direct obligation to their local constituencies. As a practical matter, however, they may labor under
considerable pressure to form a joint negotiating council to
deal with centralized authority. In any event, as Summers points
out, a centralized administration can rationalize its bargaining
program while each agent retains independent authority over
local and perhaps unique bargaining subjects. 5 4 An agent certified for a local campus has greater bargaining power in reaching an accommodation with other agents than has a minority
faculty group in dealing with a single organization certified to
represent the whole. Should, for example, the numerically superior teacher college faculties decline to support the university
faculty desire for a merit salary system, the latter has simply no
alternative in a single election district structure. Moreover, the
creation of a statewide union bureaucracy, and the removal of
later stages of the grievance machinery from the hands of
locally accountable faculty officers, may contribute to further
centralization, homogenization and a lessening of autonomy.
Inasmuch as these may be the very maladies which caused the
faculty to seek succor in collective bargaining, the failure to
all started as teachers' colleges, and they are geared up for it. We're concentrating on other things."
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1973, § 1, at 109, col. 2.
53McHugh, supra note 45, at 82-83.
5'Summers, supra note 46, at 1191-92.
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create an educationally sound election district structure will only
further exacerbate the profession's ills.
Many of the same arguments urged on behalf of systemwide units are mustered in support of the inclusion of ancillary
professional, and semiprofessional, positions with the core
faculty. 5 5 Note the reasoning of the hearing officer for the New
Jersey PERC when the issue was first presented in the New
Jersey state colleges:
It is my opinion that the appropriate unit should
not be so narrow as to include only the teaching staff.
The administrative staff and the educational support
staff have parallel interests which do not conflict with
and are not adverse to the interests of the teaching
faculty. If the unit is determined only by the narrowest
of congruent interests, the result may be so many
separate units that organization would become a practical impossibility for some groups. It would be better to
lump all professional groups at each college56excluding those
whose interests arefundamentally conflicting.
This approach ignores the fact that while interests may not
conflict, they may be highly divergent and specialized-particularly for professionals. Moreover, as several observers, including Carr and Van Eyck, point out, the reconciliation of
bargaining with faculty governance is a subtle and difficult
matter. Thus it seems almost axiomatic that the essential academic focus not be diluted by the inclusion of nonacademics in
the unit.
Contrary to this view, the Director of Representation of
New York's PERB recently reaffirmed his earlier decision to
include nonfaculty in the SUNY bargaining unit, thereby
continuing the addition of over 3,000 nonteachers to a core
faculty of 11,000. 5 7 Unlike the first proceeding, where all
parties save one sought an overall unit, a petition was filed in
this case solely for the nonfaculty. Moreover, the public employer took no position, and an intervenor sought a separate
faculty unit. Nevertheless the Director refused to recognize a
separate nonfaculty unit. He reasoned that in view of the
Board's policy in favor of larger units, the nonacademics would
be separated out only if a conflict between the two groups could
55 Gee, supra note 44, at 267; McHugh, supra note 44, at 76.
56Report and Recommendations of the Hearing Officer, State Colleges of
New Jersey 11-12 (1969) (emphasis supplied), aff'd, New Jersey State Colleges,
No. 1 (N.J. PERC 1969).
57 State of New York (State University of New York), No. C-0991 (N.Y. PERB
1974).
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be proved. Accordingly he reviewed the evidence of the disputes between the two groups in establishing negotiating goals
and in the conduct of bargaining, and concluded that a "commendable spirit of compromise" prevailed.
Understandably, in order to ascertain whether there was a
sufficient conflict the decision attends almost entirely to whether
the interests of the nonfaculty minority were dealt with roughly.
Thus it misses the point. Given divisions within the faculty, the
nonacademics represented a key "swing vote" in the election,
which they used to secure greater representation than their
members would otherwise dictate. More important, it appears
from the decision that the nonacademics bargained with
factions in the academic group in order to achieve a bargaining
consensus. On issues of job security or tenure, for example, it
appears that the nonacademics allied themselves with a faction
of nontenured faculty thereby outvoting tenured faculty on
that bargaining demand. Thus the inclusion of nonacademics
gave them an important, if not dispositive, voice over academically critical matters in which they had no valid interest.
Carr and Van Eyck are concerned that the faculty "in an
institutional sense" is not entitled to be heard in the unit determination, which is decided by the appropriate administrative
agency on the basis of the positions of the administration and
interested labor organizations. 5 They criticize the latter for
basing their positions on estimates of voter support in various
constituencies, and indeed suggest that some institutional "managements" have been far more faithful in representing the
"faculty's" interests than have the labor organizations.- 9 The
degree of faithfulness depends on the authors' position of what
constitutes a desirable bargaining unit and they make it abundantly clear what they conceive the "faculty" position to be:
...the faculty could argue the case that there is such a
thing as "the academic profession," with everything
therein implied with respect to training, certification,
work standards, service ideals, and measurement of
individual performance. The faculty might claim that
such professional goals and ideals can be fulfilled only
where the cohesion and integrity of the academic
group of employees is protected against the addition
of other employees who are not properly viewed as
part of the academic profession or against the subtraction of still other employees who are most
assuredly
60
part of the company of teacher-scholars.
GARR,supra
C

note 4, at 71-72.

59

Id.
60 CARR, supra

note 4, at 71.
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While I believe this to be the most educationally defensible
unit position, the authors have overstated the procedural issue,
for they perceive "the faculty" perhaps a bit too idealistically. It
is well to note that both the medical and dental faculties of
Temple University selected representatives who were allowed
to participate in that unit determination solely for the purpose
of urging the exclusion of those faculties from any proposed

university-wide bargaining unit;6 1 a position with which it
would not appear the authors would concur. Moreover, in the
SUNY case, the university faculty senate (the "faculty" in precisely the institutional sense the authors employ) acted to expand its constituency to include nonteaching professionals
(nonfaculty) and then sought a unit determination conforming
to its revised electorate while an "outside" organization pressed
for a unit along the lines proposed by the authors.62
As noted earlier, it is possible that a majority of the core
faculty could be outvoted by a significant minority of faculty
who chose to align itself with a "swing" vote of nonfaculty. This
could be determinative of whether to select an agent, as well as
the character of the agent selected. In cases of so sharply
divided a faculty, however, the auithors do not enlighten us as to
what the "faculty" position would be. In such cases there may
well be no faculty position, in an institutional sense, to be advanced independent of the positions of the parties.
This is not to gainsay that different organizations have
taken unit positions based on pragmatic grounds. But if a lack
of appreciation for the academic significance of the issues must
be assigned, it ought to be settled on the tribunals determining
the bargaining units, rather than in the organizations presenting the issues for their determination. Moreover, decisions
which seem aberrational from the authors' perspective may be
justified by the institution's own practices. Thus in their critical
view of the City University of New York unit, the authors fail
to note that a large number of the nonteaching personnel there
61 Temple

University, Nos. R-1 123E, 1137-E (Pa. PERA 1972).
Professor Alice Cook of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at
Cornell University, then a member of the SUNY Senate, made it abundantly clear
in the debate on the measure just what that body was doing.
In labor relations what we are going through now is a process which is
rather looked down upon and is referred to as "blanketing in". We are
trying to make an arrangement in advance of consulting the persons we
would like to represent and sort of overwhelming the situation in advance
rather than deriving a representation from the will of the persons who
would be represented.
SUNY Senate Exhibit 47F at 23, State of New York (State University of New
York). Nos. C-0253, 0260, 0262, 0263, 0264, 0351, 2 N.Y. PERB 3070-4010
(1969).
62
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included, whose very professional status the authors question,
are considered "voting faculty" by institutional regulation and
are accorded academic tenure. Inasmuch as the university was
itself responsible for a most irregular institutional bed, I cannot fault the New York PERB as Procrustean if it conformed
the unit to those dimensions.
A concluding comment must be reserved for the authors'
proposed remedy of a different kind of representation election
-one in which the faculty votes first on collective bargaining in
principle, and only if a majority are so in favor does the selection of the actual organization take place. 63 I fail to see how
the proposed two-stage election has anything to do with the
determination of the unit, a decision which must logically precede any election. Curiously, the authors do not propose an
electoral determination by the core faculty of the composition
of the unit, though such a suggestion might well be experimented with, at least on certain key issues. For example, both
academics and nonacademics could vote independently on
whether they desired a single unit. Such a ballot would produce
'64
the clearest possible indication of "felt community of interest."
A proposal similar to Carr and Van Eyck's was made to the
California Assembly Advisory Council on Public Employee Relations, 65 and was heavily criticized by the faculty association of
the University of California at Berkeley-an off-shoot of the
academic senate. 66 The Berkeley faculty pointed out that there
is no such thing as "collective bargaining" in the abstract, but
only as it is represented in a particular agent at a particular institution. It is true that where several organizations compete,
the "no agent" faction may be placed in something of a dilemma
since they may divide the votes of their second choice, eliminating it from the run-off and leaving only less preferred candidates. Those conscientiously opposed to collective bargaining
may feel compromised. Under the authors' scheme, however,
63 CARR, supra note 4, at 70. As the authors point out such an election was
voluntarily arranged by all parties at Youngstown State University (Ohio). More
recently the Vermont State Employees Labor Relations Board ordered a similar
election for the faculties of the Vermont State Colleges. Not only is there a "yes
or no' first ballot but write-in candidates and "no agent" will apparently be
allowed in the follow-up ballot. Orders Establishing Terms of Election, (Vt. SELRB
1973). The recent comprehensive bargaining law in Oregon provides for the twostage election in higher education. 2 CCH LAB. L. REP., ORE. 47,108 (1973).
64 Indeed, after the merger of AFT and NEA in CUNY, such an election was
held as a result of which the two bargaining units were consolidated.
65 THE CALIFORNIA

ASSEMBLY

ADVISORY

COUNCIL

ON

PUBLIC

TIONS, FINAL REPORT 73 (1973). The Council rejected the suggestion.
66 Feller, supplemental statement to the California Assembly

on Public Employee Relations. August 24. 1972. on file with reviewer.

EMPLOYEE

RELA-

Advisory Council

1974)

BOOK REVIEW

those conscientiously committed to collective bargaining who
happen not to favor any of the contenders may feel equally
compromised. Thus I share the conclusion of the Berkeley
faculty association that "the only meaningful election is one
in which the voters choose between real alternatives, not abstractions."
IV. SCOPE OF BARGAINING
After reviewing several collective agreements, including
those at St. John's University (N.Y.) and Oakland University
(Mich.), Carr and Van Eyck speculate that the dearth of attention to matters of institutional governance contained in them
may be the result of an unconscious acceptance of what I have
termed a "managerialist" conception of collective bargaining,
one which argues that both the law and theory of collective bargaining reserve to management the right to manage and to the
union the right to challenge. 67 I have attempted to show that
this theory, while generally valid, is not an absolute, and that it
is inapplicable in a university setting. 6 8 Moreover, I disagree
that the agreements noted by Carr and Van Eyck tacitly accept
the theory. The St. John's and Oakland agreements in particular attempt to guarantee and strengthen the faculty's role in
institutional governance independent of collective bargaining. 69 However, Donald Wollett, who considers the elimination
of faculty governance to be a desirable goal, argues that the
lawful scope of bargaining may preclude agreement of the St.
John's or Oakland type.7 0 Again a separate view of the public
and private sectors is required.
In the private sector the determination of what is a mandatory bargaining subject under the federal Act is governed by
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 7 ' which provides two
tests: is the subject matter of such vital concern that it is likely
67 CARR, supra note 4, at 253. They also assert that ". . . no contract at a fouryear institution creates a faculty senate or similar basic agency of faculty governance where none had existed." Id. The observation can be explained in large
measure by the prevalence of some form of faculty government at most institutions especially those likely to engage in collective bargaining. It should be noted,
however, that the initial collective agreements for Ashland College (Ohio) and
the New York Institute of Technology do revise considerably if not in fact create
entire faculty governments, independent of the bargaining agent, by their initial
collective agreements.
68 See Finkin, supra note 38.
69 Id.

70 Wollett, Historical Development

of Collective Bargaining, in

PROCEEDINGS OF

THE FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE

Benewitz ed. 1973).
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).

BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 28 (M.
71
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to lead to conflict between management and labor and, if so, is
collective bargaining the appropriate means of resolving the
issue?7 2 Experience in collective bargaining provides the prime
source to guide the determination whether the matter is amenable to the collective bargaining process.
Accordingly, Fibreboard standards fully contemplate the
negotiability of the faculty's role in setting educational policy.
First, the faculty's role in educational decisions such as curriculum, admissions, selection and retention of deans and other
key educational officers, selection, retention and promotion of
colleagues, research policies, calendar, grading policies, and the
like, is a matter of vital concern to the faculty. As noted earlier,
disputes concerning the weight to be accorded by the governing
board to faculty views on such matters are frequently quite
heated and the faculty's desire to protect its role in decisionmaking is a major factor militating toward faculty use of collective bargaining. Second, a review of collective agreements indicates that such matters are commonly bargained about both directly, as in setting the standards and procedures for faculty
personnel decisions, and indirectly, by incorporating into the
agreement7 3 the faculty handbook, institutional policies and past
practices.
In public employment the situation is more complicated.
State legislation must be looked to and, as Wollett points out,
several states appear to place substantial legislative restrictions
on the scope of bargaining.7 4 Moreover, there is significant
support for the proposition that the exigencies of public employment require a narrower scope of bargaining than in the
private sector. 75 Thus even where a general "terms and conditions of employment" definition of the scope of bargaining
is adopted from the federal Act, state judicial construction has
often sought support in Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard rather than in the majority's conclusion. 76 While his
opinion has been criticized for supplying a merely "visceral

7'2
Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 62
(1965).
73See contracts discussed in Finkin, note 38, supra, and in Mortimer and Lozier,
Contracts at Four-Year Institutions, in FACULTY UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1973).
71 Wollett, supra note 70.
5
See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971).
76See, e.g., National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan.
741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973); Burlington County College Faculty Ass'n v. Board of
Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 311 A.2d 733 (1973); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd.
of Educ., 215 N.W.2d 837 (S.D. 1974); Spokane Educ. Ass'n v. Barnes, 83 Wash.
2d 366, 517 P.2d 1362 (1974).
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test,"7 7 the vague notion that "terms and conditions" were
meant as "words of limitation" allows the courts to rationalize a
narrowed scope of bargaining.
I have suggested that Fibreboard standards can properly
apply to professional employees in the public sector.7 The
threshold inquiry is the employee interests sought to be represented. On this, the highly trained professional such as an
attorney, physician or professor, has a range of employmentrelated interests which, for the blue-collar worker, would trench
on "management rights," but which may be critical to the job
performance and satisfaction of the professional. The test then
becomes "whether the process of bargaining, entailing tradeoffs and the tacit threat of coercion, but looking toward a
mutually acceptable agreement, is the appropriate means of
dealing with the discrete issues. '7 9 On this point, the bargaining process does not seem ill-suited to resolve questions of the
manner and extent of participation of publicly employed professionals in their agency's policy development.
However, Summers has recently supplied a more refined
analysis, which accepts the position that the public sector re80
quires a different determination of the scope of bargaining.
Viewing collective bargaining as a political process, he would
limit bargaining to those matters in which the massed resistance
of the public (taxpayers and users of public service) demands a
larger voice on the part of employees than is otherwise available
to them. Thus he proposes as a standard a decided imbalance in
bargaining power on the issue as well as real adversariness between the parties. For example, the public school curriculum
would not be negotiable, because there is no reason to believe
that either teachers or their employers have a unified position
on it. In addition, bilateral bargaining precludes the full airing
of all views. Thus curriculum is simply not the kind of issue in
which there is that degree of bilateral adversariness requisite
for bargaining, for "the decision is not made solely on the merits
of the issue, but as part of a package which results from trading
off unrelated items. Because of its structure and function,
collective bargaining does not provide an appropriate political
process for making such decisions. '8 1 On the other hand, Summers agrees that teacher participation in non-bargainable
7 Summers, supra note 72, at 61. For a further critique of Mr. Justice Stewart's
opinion, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROcEss 70-72 (1968).
78 Finkin, Bargaining and Professionalism, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1974, at
79 (1974).
7
9 Id. 100.
80 Summers, supra note 46.
81

Id. 1195.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:217

educational matters is desirable. Accordingly, "the school board
can properly be authorized or even required, to consult with
them before making a decision. But no organization should
purport to act as an exclusive representative; the discussions
should not be closed; and the decision should not be bargained
82
for or solidified as an agreement."
To be sure, one can distinguish the situation of the school
teacher from that of the university professor simply on the
sharp variance in the degree of professionalism. The latter has
an established tradition of faculty participation which he is
seeking to protect through the collective agreement. The
former is attempting to use the collective agreement as a bootstrap means of achieving recognition of a right to participate
at all. That distinction may not be essential, for the "procedural agreement" 83 of the kind I have been discussing would
meet the Summers test of negotiability; collective bargaining
can provide the "authorizing" machinery pursuant to which
teachers participate in policy formulation. First, it must be
assumed that, as in matters of personnel administration which
lack budgetary implications, demands for more secure protection of faculty participation in policy matters will meet employer resistance. "In negotiations, the competing claims are between efficiency and fairness, discretion and equal treatment,
flexibility and regulation by established rule. Private sector
experience has demonstrated that these issues are best worked
out by face-to-face discussions between unions and management across the bargaining table. ' 84 Second, while individual
faculty members may disagree over details, there is a general
consensus in the faculty for participation in policy formulation.
Even under a scope of bargaining more restrictive than in the
private sector, the faculty should be allowed to negotiate its
future role in governance. A procedural agreement produced
by this process differs from traditional governance in that the
faculty enjoys the right to participate, not at the suffrance of
the governing board and presumably revocable at its will, 83 but
as the result of a bilateral and enforceable agreement. Thus
even where the scope of bargaining is held rightly to preclude
negotiations on "basic educational policy," the reasoning which
82 Id.

83 For a fuller explanation of the notion of a "procedural agreement," see
Stevens, The Professors and Collective Action-Which Kind? (paper presented at
the 25th Anniversary of the University of Minnesota Industrial Relations Center
(1971)).
84 Summers, supra note 46, at 1183.
85 For an astonishing

example, see, Searle

100 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ist Dist. 1972).

v. Regents, 23 Cal. App. 3d. 448,
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supports that distinction should not apply to the procedural
questions attendant to the formulation of the policy.
One difficulty with this approach is that a scope of bargaining so defined could conceivably allow the agent to demand
unilateral control for, or place undue limitations on, certain
"management" matters by operating under the rubric of bargaining for the procedures governing their determination. By
the same token, however, the public employer could seek farreaching "management rights" and "zipper" clauses, the effect of which would be to nullify faculty governance. However,
it should be remembered that merely because the demands
could be made does not render the subject matter nonbargainable, for it is highly unlikely that either alternative would be
effectively realized. A related and perhaps more serious difficulty is that the agent could also bargain to restrict the participation of other groups, such as students, and would permit the
agent to negotiate a role for itself in such decisions, ostensibly
as the faculty's "representative," in addtion to or in lieu of an
internal faculty governing body. One corrective could be legislative, as in the recent Montana higher education collective
bargaining act which limits the agent's right of exclusive representation by providing that the act shall not interfere "with the
right of the faculty senate or similar representative bodies of
faculty, or the committees thereof from consulting with and ad86
vising any unit administration concerning matters of policy.
A similar effort to protect the rights of collegial bodies in the
absence of explicit legislation can be seen in a recent decision
by the New York PERB, holding the union's demand to exclude
students from faculty personnel committees in the City University to be a nonmandatory bargaining subject.8 7 Relying on
decisions in public school cases and on Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard, the Board reiterated that although
evaluation procedures are negotiable the composition of evaluation committees under those procedures is a management
prerogative not mandatorily bargainable. In response to Member Crowley's criticism that such a distinction is anomalous
where intra-unit peer evaluation is involved, the two member
majority went to some length to state its support for faculty
participation.
The right of the faculty to negotiate over terms and
conditions of employment does not enlarge or contract
86 H.B. 1032, Montana Laws of 1974, 4A BNA LAB. REL. REP., MONT. SLL
36:218a, 218f (1974).
87 Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., No. U-0904 (N.Y. PERB 1974)
(Member Crowley, dissenting).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:217

the traditional prerogatives of collegiality; neither does
it subsume them. These prerogatives may continue to
be exercised through the traditional channels of academic committees and faculty senates and may be
altered in the same manner as was available prior to
the enactment of the Taylor Law. We note with approval the observation that "faculty must continue to
manage, even if that is an anomaly. They will, in a
sense, be on both sides of the bargaining table." We
would qualify this observation, however; faculty may
be on both sides of the table, but not their union. 8 8
The Board concluded that collective bargaining "is not designed
to resolve policy questions regarding the structure of governance" 89 inasmuch as other interest groups may be disabled
from participation in that decision by bilateral agreement.
The decision simply is put too broadly. It would logically
prevent the collective agreement from incorporating existing
governance provisions, inasmuch as any such bargaining demand would perforce "subsume" traditional prerogatives.
Moreover, the issue was not whether the "composition of committees that evaluate employees" is negotiable-on that general
question Member Crowley's dissent is compelling-but whether
a demand is negotiable which prohibits local faculty governing
bodies from allowing student participation on such committees.
Phrased more precisely, a strong argument would be made,
along the lines sketched out by Summers, that the discrete issue
does not lend itself to the bargaining process. This is distinguishable, however, from seeking a contractual commitment
that the administration adhere to a system of faculty governance.
The PERB decision is valuable for recognizing, contrary
to the "managerialist" view, that the faculty does not abnegate
its responsibilities in institutional decisions by the selection of a
collective representative. 90 But, in essence, the PERB has attempted to separate bargaining and governance entirely, preserving the respective roles of faculty and union and preventing
them from interfering with one another. As the PERB recognizes, however, the scope of bargaining cannot be narrowed
solely to economic matters. Once bargaining extends to ques85 Id. at 8 (slip opinion).
89Id.

10The California Assembly Advisory Council, for example, assumes, wrongly,
that collective
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tions of personnel policy, it perforce confronts its relationship
to institutional governance. Thus, while the PERB may have
been correct on the discrete issue it was given to decide, the far
broader distinction it drew is simply unworkable and hinders
the parties from achieving a satisfactory combination of bargaining and governance. Given a sufficiently flexible scope of
bargaining, the evidence thus far indicates that such an accommodation is achievable.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of an alternative, collective bargaining holds
the promise of at least a partial remission of the ills of a depressed and increasingly bureaucratized profession. Whether
it will prove a satisfactory instrument will depend on a number
of variables, including the operation of legal institutions. Insofar as the latter is concerned, however, I am far more sanguine
than Carr and Van Eyck about the consequences of the legal
relationships created or reinforced as a result of collective bargaining. Indeed, the university experience may well set the
model to be emulated by other of the learned professions which
find themselves employed by institutions to serve clients. Like
professors, organized lawyers and physicians will want to secure
economic benefits and a voice in agency policy. As these services
come to be viewed as rights rather than privileges, much as
higher education, appeals to the image of a bygone independent
practitioner relationship will become increasingly out of touch
with reality. Carr and Van Eyck's Elegy, doubtless doomed to be
replicated by others as Collective Bargaining Comes to the Hospital
or Collective Bargaining Comes to the Public Defender's (or District
Attorney's) Office, makes piquant but ultimately dissatisfying
reading.
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